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This dissertation reviews and summarizes previous findings of merger announcement 
related abnormal returns. A sample of 183 event windows is collected and analyzed to 
observe cross-country differences. The results are discussed under five specific topics: 
location, payment method, strategic focus, size and corporate governance. The findings of 
this review indicate that target banks enjoy high abnormal returns both in the U.S. and in 
Europe. Bidding banks seem to incur negative returns on average while small value 
creation was observed for the merged entity. Target banks are generating higher returns in 
USA while bidding banks show better performance in Europe. A minor indication of 
decreasing U.S. bank returns is observed as the measurement period increases. 
Geographical and activity focus as well as use of cash as a payment method are seen to 
contribute to the higher abnormal returns.  
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The objective of this work project (WP) is to conduct an extensive empirical review by 
answering the following research question: “What conclusions and suggestions for research  
can be made by reviewing existing findings on abnormal returns related to bank merger 
announcements?“. The small amount of reviews and the scattered nature of previous findings 
make this an interesting subject to study.   
The existing literature on bank merger effects can be divided into two approaches: 1.) the 
examination of efficiency gains through financial ratios or cost and profit functions1
More detailed reviews on bank merger related abnormal returns are presented in 
subsections of empirical and theoretical papers. Becher (2000) collects 6 observations 
without distinguishing between event windows lengths. Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey 
(2007b) collect 15 observations
 and 
2.) the study of stock market reactions to merger announcements. This review focuses on 
the latter. Previous efforts to examine bank merger related abnormal returns are vast 
especially for the American market but few studies holistically review and analyze these 
results. Amel et al. (2004) and Pilloff and Santomero (1997) conduct a review of merger 
related efficiency effects. They provide a brief overview of abnormal returns without 
categorizing results from previous studies. Rhoades (1994) summarizes previous merger 
performance studies in tables but does not directly refer to numerical results of these 
works.  
2 from previous studies and present six observations for the 
(-1/+1) window allowing initial cross-country comparisons. Beitel and Schiereck (2001) 
offer the most extensive review with a table of 31 observations3
                                                            
1 See e.g. Vander Vennet (1996) and Altunbas and Marques (2008) for Europe and Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993) and Akhavein, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) for U.S. 
2 12 American/3 European 
3 27 American / 2 European / 1 Norwegian /1 German-American 
 but their cross-country 
comparison is limited due to the different window lengths between Europe and USA. 
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Most recently Yang and Liu (2008) review 29 observations4
Location incorporates three aspects identified in previous empirical works: 1. national 
differences, 2. interstate vs. intrastate differences and 3. domestic versus cross-border 
differences. These are important since cross-country variations in e.g. regulations, market 
structure, market characteristics and culture can effect the generation of CARs. The level 
of branch overlapping can further impact the resulting cost efficiencies
 from previous studies. 
Regarding existing studies the small amount of comparable observations as well as 
organization of the data according to the publication year instead of the event window 
length and the lack of consideration for specific transaction related characteristics hinder 
the discovery of patterns and differences to the full extent. Thus, the existing evidence can 
be considered incomplete.  
This WP will provide a holistic examination of previous findings while addressing the 
identified shortcomings. First, a brief and illustrative review of the methods for measuring 
abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) is presented. This is 
followed by a discussion of the five determining factors of CARs: 1. location, 2. method 
of payment, 3. strategy focus, 4. size and 5. corporate governance. The division of results 
is important as previous empirical works address these factors and their examination 
might provide valuable findings for investors and bank managers indicating what type of 
mergers produce the highest returns.    
5. In this WP a 
review of 183 different event windows6 is conducted. Collection of a large sample of 
mergers and acquisitions is important for comparing abnormal returns across time. 
However, this review does not distinguish the results between mergers and acquisitions. 
Due to previous findings7
                                                            
4 26 American/ 2 European / 1 Norwegian 
5 See Becher and Campbell, 2005 
6 Presented in Table 9 in the Appendices  
7 See Krasker, 1996 
 of negative market reaction to issues of new shares 
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distinguishing the results between different payment methods is important. The general 
view regards to strategy tends to support mergers with activity focus and concentration on 
core competences. However, in banking diversification into related industries such as 
insurance can allow benefits from cross-selling and diversification of risk exposure. The 
issue of size plays important role in revenue generation as consolidation and centralization 
of functions can help smaller banks to obtain scale economies. Mergers between larger 
banks can lead to increased market power and benefits from being too-big-to-fail (TBTF), 
although diseconomies of scale have also been reported8
                                                            
8 See Hensel, 2006 
. Consideration of corporate 
governance related issues accounts for managerial motivations and compensation, which 
can effect decisions to engage in non-value maximizing mergers and thus potentially 
destroy shareholder value.  
This WP contributes to the existing literature by organizing and categorizing previous 
findings in a coherent way. Collection and analysis of a large sample allows discovery of 
cross-country differences. The large amount of observations also enables the study of 
CARs across time. The findings of this review validate the previous empirical results in 
the literature and provide a minor indication that U.S. banks returns might decrease as the 
event window is stretched.  
The remainder of this WP is organized according to the following structure: Section 2. 
covers how to measure abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. Section 3. 
reviews and discusses previous empirical results under five subsections: 3.1. location, 3.2. 
method of payment, 3.3. strategy focus, 3.4. size and 3.5. corporate governance. Section 4. 
concludes the findings of this review and provides suggestions for future research. The 
terms of return and abnormal return are used interchangeably in the following sections.  
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2. Measuring Abnormal Returns 
This section reviews the basic methodological approaches used for measuring abnormal 
returns. The focus is on empirical studies based on the event study methodology.  In this 
methodology researchers consider a sample of selected merger events and then measure 
the return resulting from the mergers against a pre-determined benchmark to determine the 
abnormal returns. This benchmark is usually based on a national bank industry index or a 
general market index such as the S&P 500, NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, or a weighted 
combination of these. A common approach is to apply multivariate regression approaches 
in order to control for exogenous effects that might distort the benchmark.  
2.1. Event Window 
Apart from few exceptions, returns are measured on a daily level by using a time interval 
called an event window. Event windows incorporate a specific number of days around the 
date of the merger announcement. The date of the merger announcement is often referred 
as the event date. It is usually the date when the merger is announced in Financial Times 
or reported to a national regulatory entity.  
2.1.1 Length of the Event Window 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) criticize the use of announcement date when studying 
abnormal returns. They note that in less efficient markets leakages of information can 
significantly distort the results. Houston and Ryngaert (2007) address this by setting the 
announcement date as the information leakage date. Caruso and Palmucci (2008) find that 
by using the rumor date instead of the announcement date the overall market value 
creation can actually alter from negative to positive. Other studies have tried to address 
this problem by incorporating pre-announcement event days in the event windows. The 
use of pre-announcement event days is beneficial as it can reveal leakages of information, 
market anticipation or miss-identification of the correct event date (Whalen, 1997). 
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Shorter windows might fail to capture efficiency gains related to the merger as 
rationalization of branches, integration of data systems, refocusing of lending policies and 
providing new product training for the target bank can take time to generate the aspired 
improvements (Amel et al, 2004). On the other hand narrower windows reduce the 
probability that external events can distort the returns (Whalen, 1997). This review finds a 
minor indication that the negative returns of U.S. banks might augment as the length of the 
length of the event window increases9
In this formula the Nt   denotes the number of shares that have a return on day t. 
.  
2.2. Testing for Abnormal Returns 
The most common approach for testing abnormal returns is a method that was originally 
presented by Brown and Warner (1985). The calculation of abnormal returns incorporates 
a model where the return of the market (Rmt) and a bank stock (Rit) are linearly linked to 
each other. In this model the abnormal returns (ARit) are determined by subtracting the 
predicted returns (αi + βi Rmt) from the actual realized returns (Rit). The αi and βi 
coefficients found within the predicted return formula represent ordinary least square – 
estimates for the market model parameters of the firm.   [I] 
I   𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  (𝛼𝛼� + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 )         
As the samples tend to include more than one bank, it is necessary to calculate the average 
abnormal returns on a specific day. Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990) have conducted 
this using the following formula, which is just a simple average of all of the abnormal 
returns at a specific time (e.g. merger announcement date t -1). 








                                                            




2.3 Calculation of CARs 
As the common approach in the literature is to examine event windows, it is necessary to 
adjust the daily abnormal returns (AR) according to the chosen window length. This is 
done by calculating cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the time interval that has 
been decided. The CARs are calculated by summing up the average daily abnormal 
returns according to the length of the event window. The following formula gives the 
CARs for one of the most popular event windows -1/+1, where t denotes the date of the 
merger announcement.      [III] 




The procedure explained above is able to provide the CARs for the bidder and the target 
bank. However, in order to calculate the returns for the merged entity further steps have to 
be taken. The combined return for the target and the bidder is achieved by calculating a 
weighted average of the CARs that have been generated due to the merger. This is 
illustrated in the following formula by Houston and Ryngaert (1994). [IV]    
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴������ =  
(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ) ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 )) +  (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  (𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ) ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  (𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ))
(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ) + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 (𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ))
 
The common approach seems to be using market value as the weight in this formula. 
However, some studies have included results with different weighting factors like total 
assets or total equity as reported in the balance sheet (see e.g. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 
2000). In case of using market value, the weights are calculated for a date before the actual 
merger announcement e.g. t – 10. This approach is criticized by Delong (2001) as the 
resulting value gains might not realize symmetrically between the two parties and thus this 
presents a risk of positive or negative distortion for the combined results. Becher (2000) 
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having previously used a simple method of weighting the CARs,  later  (Becher and 
Campbell, 2005) addressed Delong’s concerns by using her model that accounts for the 
daily changes in the sum of the acquirer and target bank during the event window, as 
presented below, with MV denoting market value.    [V] 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴������ =  � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤  𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ℎ−1
𝑤𝑤=1
(
𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ) +  𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 )




3. Determinants of CARs 
This section discusses CARs under five determining factors10
3.1. Location 
In this first subsection CARs are discussed in relation to location under three topics 
identified in previous empirical works. Consideration of these location related aspects is 
important as cross-country variations e.g. in regulations, market structure, market 
characteristics and culture can influence the CARs. 
. These factors have often 
been addressed in the empirical literature and a wider examination of them might reveal 
valuable findings for investors and bank managers indicating what type of mergers 
produce the highest returns. 
3.1.1 Сross-Country Comparison11
The smaller amount of European observations has limited identification of cross-country 




                                                            
10 1. location, 2. method of payment, 3. strategy focus, 4. size and 5. corporate governance. 
11 For summarized results from previous studies see Table 10 in the Appendices 
12 See Amihud, Delong and Saunders (2002), Delong (2003b), Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2007), Valkonov and Kleimeier (2007) 
. Since European results did not start to emerge until the late 1990’s there is a 
real need for cross-country comparisons. Discovery of similarities is important as they 
might justify the extension of certain U.S. findings to Europe while discovery of 
differences can propose interesting opportunities for future research. 
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3.1.1.1. Return on Target Banks 
Previous U.S. studies find higher CARs for the target banks than for the bidders. Similar 
findings are presented also in European studies13
When examining CARs from under 10 day event windows [Graph I] American banks 
generate most of the CARs that exceed 15% while European banks generate most of the 
CARs below 5%. The calculated average CAR (13,1%) for the U.S. banks is higher than 
the European average (9,7%)
. Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) explain 
this result by a zero-sum game, where the targets are beneficiaries at the expense of the 
bidders.  
14. Similar finding can be observed with the daily AAR15 (U.S. 
1,6%/ Europe 0,8%)16 as well as with samples of specific event windows17. While European 
CARs from over 20 day event windows are scattered there seems to be a slight indication 
of reducing CARs for the U.S. banks as the measurement period increases [Graph I]. The 
returns of the Italian target banks are more similar to the other European observations 
while Canadian observations seem to more coincide with their U.S. counterparts. By 
reviewing the empirical findings it can be concluded that American target banks do 
generate higher CARs, which has already been found in previous studies18. In addition, 
European and US target banks are seen to have more deviating CARs than the bidders and 
the merged entity19
Ismail and Davidson (2005) suggest that the lower European returns originate from 
differences in regulatory frameworks and market structure as well as from increased 
competition following the EU integration. Rad and Van Beek (1999) blame the inflexible 
European employment markets, which might hinder realization of cost reductions from 
. 
                                                            
13 See e.g. Valkonov and Kleimeier (2007), Beitel and Schiereck (2001) and Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000 
14 For more details see Table 2 in the Appendices 
15 Calculated by dividing the sample average CAR with average length of event windows in the sample 
16 For more details see Table 2in the Appendices 
17 For more details see Table 1in the Appendices 
18 See e.g. Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007), Delong (2003b) and Rad and Van Beek (1999) 
19 For more details see Table 1 and 2 in the Appendices 
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branch office closures and staff reductions.  This WP confirms the suggestions of previous 
reviews and empirical studies regarding the higher CARs of U.S. targets and gives a slight 
indication that U.S. target bank returns might reduce as the measurement period increases.  
3.1.1.2. Return on Bidding Banks 
Existing empirical works have established that returns of the bidding banks are 
significantly lower than of the target banks. The general logic for this is that the market 
does not believe in the abilities of the bidding banks to achieve the foreseen synergy and 
efficiency benefits to an extent that would justify the size of the bid premium.  
Comparison of CARs from under 15 day event windows [Graph II] shows higher amount 
of European banks with positive returns and higher amount of U.S. banks with negative 
CARs. Some of these negative U.S. CARs even exceed -2%. The calculated average CAR 
supports the better performance of the European banks (0,3%) against the American banks 
(-1,7%)20. This difference diminishes with daily AARs but is still observable (Europe 0,02% 
/ U.S. -0,2%)21. European banks are also seen to generate higher returns across common 
event windows: 0/0, -1/+1 and -5/+522. The minimum U.S. CARs [Graph II] seem to 
decline when the event window is extended to 20 days and over. This can be also observed 
when moving from the 0/0 and -1/+1 event windows to the -5/+5 event window23
Previous European studies observe positive CARs or no returns when using short event 
windows (Beitel and Schiereck, 2001 and Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000). Valkanov and 
. Madura 
and Wiant (1994) provide further evidence for the declining CARs by measuring 
abnormal returns over a 36 month window and observing a highly negative return of -
27,1%. From reviewing all this evidence it can be concluded that European bidding banks 
do outperform their American counterparts.  
                                                            
20 For more details see Table 2 in the Appendices 
21 For more details see Table 2 in the Appendices 
22 For more details see Table 1 in the Appendices 
23 For more details see Table 1. in the Appendices 
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Kleimeier (2007) make a similar European finding but later discover that when extending 
the event window the returns turn negative. They suggest that this is due to the market’s 
reconsideration of the bank value when signs of potential integration challenges start to 
arise. This might also be a partial explanation for the declining U.S. CARs. Amel et al. 
(2004) suggest that the poor performance of bidders could be due to using short event 
windows that cannot capture the efficiency gains, which might require longer time to 
realize. This might either indicate that investors do not believe in the bidding bank’s 
ability to achieve the gains or that the time of achieving the gains exceeds the investors’ 
time horizon, suggesting potential inefficiency of the market. This WP confirms previous 
findings24
The U.S. returns are high in under 5 day event windows, reaching almost 4% [Graph III]. 
The maximum U.S. CARs reduce when extending the window to 10 days and continue to 
decrease towards the 20 and 30 day windows. None of the European observations in 
Graph III show a negative return while there are 7 observations of negative American 
returns. In addition to having higher deviation, the U.S. average return (1,10%) is also 
 of higher returns by European bidding banks and finds a minor indication that 
as the measurement period increases the minimum CAR observations of U.S. bidding 
banks turn more negative.  
3.1.1.3. Return on Merged Entity 
The general view regarding returns on the merged entity suggests that there is no overall 
value creation. It is argued that this is due to the losses of the bidding bank offsetting the 
gains of the target (Amel et al, 2004 and Valkanov and Kleimeier, 2007). Moreover, U.S. 
banks have been observed to generate higher CARs in the early 90’s when bidding banks 
did not incur negative CARs (Valkanov and Kleimeier, 2007).  
                                                            
24 See e.g. Delong, 2003b 
13 
 
lower from the European average (1,76%) 25. However, the higher deviation and shorter 
window length of U.S. observations can distort the results and no significant difference 
can be observed between the U.S. (1,1%) and European (1,14%) daily AARs26. From 
examination of all these findings it can be concluded that although the daily AARs do not 
present clear differences, the 7 negative U.S. CARs and the reducing maximum U.S. 
CARs could indicate lower performance for American mergers. Previous studies also 
observe smaller CARs for American mergers (Delong, 2003b and Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia, 2000). While the target CARs are very high often above 10% and even exceeding 
20%, the CARs for the merged entities do not generally exceed 4%. The two observations 
exceeding the 4% limit are likely due to geographical coverage27
3.1.2. Intrastate vs. Interstate Mergers
 and the American 
observation by Zhang (1995) might be explained by methodological differences. This WP 
provides further evidence for the better performance of merged European banks and finds 
that maximum returns of U.S. banks decrease as the measurement period increases. The 
better performance of European merged banks likely originates from better performance 
of the bidders that due to their larger size have more weight in the calculation of combined 
returns.   
28
Comparison of CARs between interstate and intrastate mergers can be seen interesting as 
geographical diversification tends entail more limited possibilities for cost reduction. On 
the other hand the market might react positively to cross-state expansions presenting high 
growth potential. In the existing literature there seems to be different views on the 
definition of intrastate mergers and thus some researchers have decided to use two 
different approaches. Becher (2000) offers the following general definition:  
 
                                                            
25 Average CAR (US) 1,10% vs. 1,76% (Europe) 
26 See Table 1in the Appendices  for more details 
27 Djankov, Jindra and Klapper (2005) when studying East-Asian bank insolvencies and Caruso and Palmucci (2008) when studying inefficient Italian 
market 
28 For summarized results from previous studies see Table 3 in the Appendices 
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“Intrastate mergers are defined as those mergers that take place between targets and 
bidders within the same state. Interstate mergers are defined as those mergers that take 
place among bidder firms that are not in the same state as the target firm they are 
acquiring.” 
 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) have criticized these types of definitions as they don’t 
consider the possibility of the bidding bank having operations in the state of the target. 
Thus they propose that calculation of overlapping branch offices in a specific city can be 
seen more appropriate, as shown in the formula below29
Several empirical studies have found intrastate mergers performing better than interstate 
mergers by producing higher CARs for the target banks
:  [VI] 
𝑂𝑂𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂 =  
∑ (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖=1  𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖)
∑ (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖=1  𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖)
 
30, the bidding banks31 and the 
merged entity32
                                                            
29 In the formula n denotes the total number of cities where the target or the bidder have offices, Ti denotes the total number of offices the target has in city 
I and Bi denotes the corresponding figure for the bidder.  
30 See Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Siems (1996), Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001),Delong (2001) and Becher and Campbell (2005). 
31 See Baradwaj, Dubofsky and Fraser (1991), Siems (1996), Houston, James and Ryangaert (2001), Cornett et al. (2003) 
32 See Becher and Campbell (2005) 
. The intrastate merger CARs for the targets are quite significant ranging 
from 11,00% (-1/0) to 24,6% (-4/+1). The extent to which intrastate mergers can create 
higher returns varies between studies. While Becher and Campbell (2005) observe smaller 
difference (intra16,69% / inter13,98%) Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) find stronger 
evidence (intra24,62 / inter16,17%). The bidding banks generate negative CARs across the 
line but these losses are smaller in case of the intrastate mergers. Siems (1996) actually 
finds that the top 5 “branch overlap mergers” produce positive bidder CARs of 2,80%  
against the negative CARs of -1,58% from the bottom 5 “branch overlap mergers”. Becher 
and Campbell (2005) find intrastate mergers producing more negative CARs but they 
observe that the difference (intra-1,59% /inter -1,29%) is not statistically significant. 
Regarding the merged entity, Whalen (1997) finds that intrastate mergers outperform the 
overall sample within the -2/0 window (intra1,49% / 1,22%) and underperforms it with the -
1/0 window (intra0,78% / 0,94%). Becher and Campbell (2005) provide further evidence 
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that intrastate mergers generate higher CARs for the merged banks (intra0,87% / inter0,79%). 
Moreover, with few exceptions, Delong (2001, 2003a) finds that the target CARs increase 
across the line when the companies follow a strategy of activity focus or intrastate focus.  
From reviewing all this empirical evidence it can be concluded that the existing results 
clearly support intrastate mergers. This is in line with the conclusion of Houston, James 
and Ryngaert (2001) who observe that differences between intrastate and interstate are 
significant and argue that most bank merger value gains arise from elimination of 
overlapping operations, consolidation of backroom operations and other opportunities to 
cut costs. They further note that potential for revenue enhancement is not valued as highly 
in the market.   
3.1.3 Domestic vs. Cross-Country Mergers33
Comparison of domestic and cross-country mergers can be seen interesting as cross-border 
transactions are exposed to a variety of challenges ranging from different language and 
culture to regulatory and market inconsistencies. Moreover, limited branch overlaps and 
cost cutting opportunities can also  impact the CARs.   
 
Campa and Hernando (2008) study the differences between these two types of mergers 
and find that target banks generate lower CARs with domestic mergers when using the  -
1/+1 event window (dom3,22% / cross3,82%). Similar finding with targets is made by Cybo-
Ottone and Murgia (2000) when using a longer -10/0 event window but the returns are not 
considered statistically significant. The higher target returns in cross-country mergers 
might be due to larger bid premiums paid by foreign banks. The results regarding bidding 
banks in cross-border deals are conflicting. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) report higher 
and statistically significant bidder CARs for cross-border deals (cross1,38% / dom.-0,49%) 
while Beitel and Schiereck (2001) and Bessler and Murtagh (2002) present contradictory 
                                                            
33 See Table 4 in the Appendices for summarized results from previous studies 
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results. Amihud, Delong and Saunders (2002) discover higher negative bidder CARs when 
European banks merge with Non-European banks (cross-1,29% / dom-0,16%). Ismail and 
Davidson (2005) also suggest that the market might consider more favorably mergers 
taking place within Europe. Soussa and Wheeler (2006) find that this does not apply to the 
expansion of U.K. banks to the East European markets. Comparable results by Campa and 
Hernando (2008) are inconclusive even when median CARs and the percentage of positive 
returns are examined. However, Ismail and Davidson (2005) find that purely domestic 
mergers generate higher returns with shorter event windows but with longer windows the 
findings turn to opposite. They also note that insignificance of the results within several of 
their event windows can be a sign of investors still having too many difficulties in 
assessing the benefits of cross-border diversification. 
Regarding the merged entity, a study by Rad and Van Beek (1999) gives an indication that 
mergers with domestic focus lead to less negative CARs within the -1/+1 window (dom-
0,12% / cross-0,41%). Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) find similar evidence when 
observing a sample with high yearly overlap, although they establish significance only for 
the cross-border CARs. They explain the lower return from cross-border deals by the 
smaller deal size and the smaller size of the target banks. Campa and Hernando (2008) 
find higher average but lower median CARs for the merged banks in cross-border deals. 
This can indicate existence of extreme returns that augment the mean CARs for the 
combined entity. Moreover, the domestic deals are observed to have higher percentage of 
positive returns. Campa and Hernando (2008) rationalize this result with higher potential 
synergy effects and competition impact of domestic deals.      
Review of all of these findings suggests that purely domestic mergers tend to generate 
higher returns for the bidder and the merged entity, although several inconsistencies are 
observed. The few findings on target banks seem to support cross-country mergers, which 
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might be due to potentially higher bid premiums paid by foreign banks. The findings 
regarding the bidder and merged bank coincide with the results of Lepetit, Patry and Rous 
(2004) who by using a bivariate GARCH-model find that market reacts positively to 
mergers with geographical specialization. This reaction is suggested to result from 
expected scale economies and increased market power.  
3.2. Method of Payment34
When studying bidding banks Sushka and Bendeck (1988) find that equity transactions 
generate higher negative CARs (-1,94%) than pure cash transactions (-0,80%). Although 
the cash observation is not statistically significant this finding implies that the market 
might view cash transactions more favorably. Later results by Cornett and De (1991b), 
Grullon, Michaely and Swary (1997) and Cornett et al. (2003) also show higher returns for 
pure cash deals. By using a cross-sectional regression Grullon, Michaely and Swary 
(1997) further discover that the share price reaction for the acquirer is more positive with 
  
The chosen payment method can impact the way how the market reacts to the merger 
announcement. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that it is more favorable for companies to 
issue equity when their shares are overvalued. Krasker (1996) further states that investors 
should interpret new issues unfavorably and larger issues even more unfavorably than 
smaller ones.  
Regarding target banks Cornett and De (1991b) observe cash deals (12,55%) generating 
higher CARs than stock (9,46%) or mixed payment deals (6,28%). Grullon, Michaely and 
Swary (1997) similarly observe the highest returns for cash deals (10,95%) with the 
exception of mixed payments (9,82%) performing slightly better than pure stock deals 
(9,74%). This is in line with Becher’s (2000) results, which indicate that mix-payment 
transactions rate significantly better compared to pure stock deals.  
                                                            
34 For summarized results from previous studies see Table 5 in the Appendices 
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all-cash transactions that incorporate low premiums and a target company that is located in 
the same state.   
When studying the overall value creation for the merged entity Cornett and De (1991a) 
observe that mixed payments generate the highest returns (0,89%) against stock (0,71%)  
and cash payments (0,34%) but the differences between these are not statistically 
significant. Grullon, Michaely and Swary (1997) discover a contrary result where cash 
deals (5,01%) rate better when compared to stock (3,59%)  or mixed transactions (3,83%). 
Ismail and Davidson (2005) similarly observe that cash deals generate the highest returns. 
However, this result only applies to the longer event windows and with shorter windows 
mixed payment deals actually produce the highest returns.  
Although statistical significance for CAR differences is not established in all of studies 
works, the overall review suggests that pure cash and mixed-payments tend to generate 
higher CARs than pure stock deals. This conclusion follows the logic of Ismail and 
Davidson (2005) who argue that merger deals financed with equity tend to earn lower 
returns due to the overvaluation of the bidder’s shares. Amel et al. (2004) further note that 
mergers in the 90’s performed better due to the higher use of cash.   
3.3. Strategy Focus35
Previous empirical results regarding target banks seem to vary. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000) find that in Europe activity diversification (15,02%) generates higher CARs than 
 
The current view seems to support companies that focus on their core competencies. 
These types of companies are easier for investors to analyze and allow investors to 
diversify their own portfolios. However, in banking expansion into related industries like 
insurance can reap benefits from cross-selling and diversification of risk exposure. Thus, 
strategic focus should be included in the examination of merger CARs.  
                                                            
35 For summarized results from the previous studies see Table 6 in the Appendices 
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activity focus (14,72%). Beitel and Schiereck (2001)  discover a similar European result 
with even more extensive differences between diversification (25,39%) and focus 
(9,90%). Delong (2001) finds contrary evidence from the American market observing 
higher CARs with activity focus (diver15,32% / focus18,30%).  
This cross-country division of results is not as clear with the bidding banks. Delong (2001) 
finds smaller negative bidder CARs for activity focus (diver-1,85% / focus-1,46%). Cornett et 
al. (2003) make a similar discovery with the U.S. bidders although CARs with activity 
focus are not significant. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) provide evidence from the 
European market stating positive CARs with diversification (1,02%) and negative returns 
with focus (-0,47%). Ismail and Davidson (2005) observe positive returns for European 
bidding banks but make a contradictory finding showing slightly lower CARs for 
diversifying mergers. Bessler and Murtagh (2002) observe Canadian banks having higher 
CARs when acquiring domestic retail banks (9,6%) instead of domestic wealth 
management companies (-2,5%). The results regarding the merged entities are also 
divided. Three U.S. studies find evidence for focusing mergers36
                                                            
36  Delong (2001), Delong (2003a) with geo-focusing and Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2006) 
, while Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000) find contrary evidence in the European market. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
assume that the high CARs originate from ability to cross-selling banking and insurance 
products, which leads to improved economies of scope and revenue efficiencies 
The contradictory results by Ismail and Davidson (2005) make it harder to establish a 
coherent view of the impact of activity/product focus. However, overall examination of 
the results shows that on average product diversification tends to lead to higher CARs in 
Europe while contrary evidence is observed in the USA. The Canadian banks are seen to 




The bank efficiency literature often speaks for creation of larger banks as this can result to 
synergy benefits from reducing overlapping functions and centralizing certain operations 
like back office. However, according to some arguments improvements in efficiency can 
be achieved only up to a certain degree and after this problems related the larger size start 
to generate adverse efficiency effects and diseconomies of scale
 
38
Rad and Van Beek (1999) argue that if economies of scale and scope have significance, 
small European bidding banks should outperform their larger counterparts. Their results 
reveal that small bidding banks do actually generate higher CARs
. Thus, the issue of size 
and its relation to abnormal returns should be addressed in this review.  
39
                                                            
37 For summarized results from previous studies see Table 7 in the Appendices 
38 See Hensel (2006) 
39 In the -1/+1 window the smaller bidders generate 0,14% against. the – 0,77% of the large bidders. 
 in most the event 
windows but the differences are not statistically significant. In a more recent study Cornett 
McNutt and Tehranian (2006) find that mergers involving large banks (4,69%) are able to 
generate higher returns than smaller banks (2,21%) and the differences are statistically 
significant. By using a different methodology Kane and Pennachi (2000) discover that 
banks generate higher returns when the target institution is large. They rationalize this 
result by the Too-Big-To-Fail – factor that they refer to as Too-Big-To-Be-Disciplined-
Adequately. This benefits the bank in the form of lower financing costs, subsidies in the 
face of insolvency and passing of the uninsured credit risk to the taxpayers. A similar 
finding is made on the Norwegian market by Karceksi, Ongena and Smith (2005). They 
reveal that the target banks earn higher CARs when the bidding bank is large or when both 
the bidding bank and the target bank are large. Although the scale of CAR differences in 
their study is high, the small amount of mergers between small banks does not allow 
generalization of their results.  
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The size of the merger deal has also been addressed by some scholars. Becher and 
Campbell (2005) define large mergers to be any transactions that are greater or equal to 
$400 millions and small mergers are considered those below this limit. Although they find 
some variations between small and large deals, these differences are not statistically 
significant. Campa and Hernando (2008) define large deals as those positioned in the 
upper quartile when measuring the joint market capitalization of the merging banks. They 
establish that large deals produce significantly higher returns for the bidder. In case of 
smaller deals targets experience higher CARs around the event date but examination of 
long term effects -1/+360 supports large deals. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) note that 
European merger deals in their sample are significantly larger when compared to 
American deals, which is mostly due to the higher average size of European banks. They 
discover that small deals generate higher returns, although the results are significant only 
for the bidding banks.  
It is not easy to make clear conclusions from this review. However, regarding the bank 
size it can be argued that existing results seem to imply that mergers including larger 
banks can lead to higher CARs, although statistical insignificance hinders certainty. The 
contradictory results by Rad and Van Beek (2005) might be due to the pure concentration 
on the bidding banks. The findings regarding deal size are inconclusive and interestingly 
do not clearly support the argument for large size, although one would expect this from 
the relationship between the bank size and the deal size.  
 3.5. Corporate Governance40
Bank efficiency literature has previously discussed adverse effects related to agency 
problems and management hubris. Thus, managerial motivations, compensation and other 
  
                                                            
40 For summarized results from previous studies see Table 8 in the Appendices 
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issues are addressed in this review as they can effect decisions to engage in non-value 
maximizing mergers and thus potentially destroy shareholder value.  
Gupta and Misra (2007) assume that the market can distinguish between managerial 
motivations and that value enhancing mergers are primarily driven by expected synergy 
benefits. By analyzing a sample of 503 bids between U.S. banks they find that value 
enhancing mergers tend to generate higher CARs for the target and the merged bank. 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) observe that companies with high equity based 
compensation schemes for managers generate higher CARs and thus benefit the 
shareholders. In addition they observe that merger premiums paid in high equity based 
compensation firms are lower than in firms that do not offer significant stock options.  
Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2008) study the relation of investor protection to CARs 
by using a sample of 204 US and European bank acquirers. The findings of their study 
indicate that bidding banks generated higher CARs when they acquire targets from 
countries that have low level of investor protection regulations, such as many European 
countries. They suggest that this relates to investors demanding additional compensation 
for low governance standards and from higher risk of insider expropriation. Baradwaj, 
Fraser and Furtado (1990) study how hostility in bank takeovers can impact the CARs. 
From a sample of 23 bidding banks they find that target banks receive significantly higher 
returns when they are subject to a hostile takeover. Differences are also observed within 
the negative CAR of the Bidders, although they are not significant. Baradwaj, Dubofsky 
and Fraser (1991) examine the way how regulatory changes impact CARs. By comparing 
CARs from a subsample of 18 banks that engaged in defensive mergers to strengthen their 
position in anticipation of interstate merger deregulation, they reveal higher negative 
returns for the defensive bidders compared to the overall sample. This seems logical as a 
mergers with defensive objectives might not have as heavy focus on improving cost and 
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profit efficiencies. Sushka and Bendeck (1988) find bidders taking on emergency mergers 
with the will of bank regulators generating higher but insignificant returns. These higher 
returns are suggested to arise from potential strengthening of the market position, 
elimination of competitors as well as potential funding and validation received from the 
financial regulator. Moreover, successful restructuring of the target through staff reduction 
and branch closures might help to sort out the distressed banks as has been previously 
observed in the 1990’s financial crisis (Honkapohja, 2009). The findings from this review 
suggest that governance practices have positive impact on abnormal returns as lack of 
managerial entrenchment and high investor protection reap better results. Moreover, the 
benefits of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders can also be observed.  
4. Conclusion 
This empirical review of merger announcement related CARs suggests differences 
between the CAR determinants. It is found that target banks enjoy  significant merger 
related wealth effects both in the U.S. and in Europe. Bidding banks seem to generate 
negative and merged banks slightly positive CARs on average. U.S. targets outperform 
their European counterparts, while European bidding banks and merged banks beat 
American counterparts by generating slightly positive CARs. A minor indication of 
declining U.S. bank returns is found when the event window is extended. Review of the 
findings further suggests that market seems to value more mergers that lead to activity 
focus and geographical focus. The use of cash and a mix of cash/shares are observed to 
dominate pure stock as the optimal payment method. Small evidence is found to support 
bank size but results regarding deal size are inconclusive. Moreover, correct motivations 
for engaging in mergers and high equity compensation are seen to increase CARs.  
This review has evoked several interesting questions that could be pursued in future 
works. First, the current US and Europe dominated focus could be extended to emerging 
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markets, especially to the BRIC-economies. The saturation of the banking market in the 
developed economies leads to banks seeking new growth opportunities. In this regard 
understanding the shareholder value effects that relate to global mergers would be 
interesting and might potentially allow extension of previous findings to a global scale. 
Future works should use standardized even window lengths as this would facilitate 
comparison. Moreover, there is clear need for studying merger effects using longer 
measurement periods. Only few studies measure CARs with over 20 day event windows 
and thus some impacts might remain hidden. In addition, longer event windows might 
provide validation for the suggestion of declining CARs of U.S. banks. Regards to the 
financial crisis event studies examining distressed banks would be welcomed. These might 
confirm the suggestions of Sushka and Bendeck (1988) of the potential benefits of taking 
over distressed targets. Studies on activity diversification mergers should focus more on 
cross-selling benefits with insurance companies as these could explain some of the 
inconsistent results found in Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000). Previous research has 
already established relationship between specific antitakeover provisions and firm value. 
Kadyrzhanova (2006) observes antitakeover provisions leading to higher shareholder 
value in concentrated industries and lower value in unconcentrated industries. Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrel (2009) find several (IRRC) provisions leading to large negative 
abnormal returns. Brown and Caylor (2006) further discover that poison pills and 
staggered boards have negative impact on firm valuation. It would be interesting to 
expand these studies to market reactions to merger announcements. Previous studies 
(Ramaswamy, 1997) have also established that strategic similarities between bidder and 
target lead to better performance and it would be interesting to see if similar finding can 
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-5/+5 -1/+1 0/0 
  n mean med. Stdev t-stat [Min;Max] n mean med. Stdev t-stat [Min;Max] n mean med. Stdev t-stat [Min;Max] 
Targets (US) 4 12,7 13,5 4,26 0,69 [6,9 ; 17,1] 5 13,4 13,0 4,90 2,19 [7,8 ; 20,2] 3 9,6 11,4 5,35 0,50 [3,6 ; 13,9] 
Targets (EUR) 4 11,0 13,0 4,30 -0,68 [4,6 ; 13,5] 7 8,9 12,1 5,23 -1,71 [2,4 ; 14,8] 3 8,0 8,3 4,16 -0,55 [3,8 ; 12,1] 
Bidders (US) 6 -2,0 -2,1 1,20 -0,43 [-3,2 ; -0,3] 8 -1,5 -1,7 0,66 -1,88 [-2,4 ; -0,7] 5 -1,0 -1,4 0,80 -0,57 [-1,5 ; 0,4] 
Bidders (EUR) 1 -0,1 -0,1 nr nr [-0,1 ; -0,1] 7 0,1 0,0 0,73 2,00 [-0,9 ; 1,0] 3 -0,2 -0,1 0,56 0,91 [-0,8 ; 0,4] 
Combined (US) 4 2,2 1,0 3,51 -0,02 [-0,5 ; 7,3] 2 2,1 2,1 2,54 0,43 [0,3 ; 3,9] 0 - - - - - 
Combined (EUR) 3 2,3 2,5 0,74 0,04 [1,5 ; 2,9] 5 1,4 1,4 1,12 -0,32 [0,02 ; 2,7] 1 0,9 0,9 nr nr [0,9 ; 0,9] 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Graphs 1,2 and 32
Item 
 
n Mean Median Stdev AVG Window 
AAR         
(1 day) T-Stat 
Targets (US) 39 13,11 13,53 3,99 8,28 1,58 8,79 
Targets (EUR) 35 9,68 12,35 5,66 11,51 0,84 -0,29 
Bidders (US) 52 -1,66 -1,50 2,14 10,35 -0,16 -2,11 
Bidders (EUR) 20 0,26 0,09 0,74 11,50 0,02 5,66 
Combined (US) 28 1,10 0,67 1,74 9,93 0,11 -1,09 




                                                            
1 This table presents median CARs and Average CARs calculated for 3 event windows, the t-stat is refers to difference between the specific subsample and the overall sample (US + Europe sample) and is calculated 
with the general formula for unequal sample sizes with unequal variance. nr denotes that the observation is not representative.  
2 This table presents median CARs and Average CARs for the observations in Graphs I,II and III. Similar to the Graphs this table only considers statistically significant previous findings. The 1 day AAR is calculated by 
dividing the sample average CAR by the average number of days the event windows include in the sample. The t-stat is calculated similarly as in Table 1.  
Table 3. CARs – Intrastate and Interstate Mergers 
Table 3
Paper Comment Target Bidder Combined Target Bidder Combined Sample Period Event Window Country Coverage
Hannan and Wolken (1989) Unweighted entity - - 19,59ns - - -25,87ns 1982-1987 -15/0 USA
- - 8,67ns - - -41,36ns 1982-1987 -15/+15 USA
Weighted entity - - 1,82ns - - -1,62ns 1982-1987 -15/0 USA
- - 0,43ns - - -3,16ns 1982-1987 -15/+15 USA
Baradwaj, Dubofsky and Fraser (1991) - -1,11*** - - -1,91*** - 1981-1987 -1/0 USA
- -1,45*** - - -2,87*** - 1981-1987 -2/+2 USA
- -2,09*** - - -3,65*** - 1981-1987 -5/+5 USA
Cornett and Tehranian (1992) 11,00*** -1,90*** - 4,70*** 0,34ns - 1982-1987 -1/0 USA
Siems (1996) Top5 vs. Bottom5 Office Overlaps 13,82*** 2,80** - 6,95*** -1,58* - 1995/1995 -1/+1 USA
Whalen (1997) diversifying = divers.+ non-divers. - - 1,49** - - 1,22** n/a -2/0 USA
diversifying = divers.+ non-divers. - - 0,78*** - - 0,94*** n/a -1/0 USA
Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) 23,28na -5,45na - 11,43na -4,23na - 1985-1990 -4/+1 USA
24,88na -1,73na - 23,93na -4,93na - 1991-1996 -4/+1 USA
24,62na -2,69na - 16,17na -4,4na - 1985-1996 -4/+1 USA
DeLong (2001) 18,3*** -1,46*** 0,62ns 15,32*** -1,85*** -0,40ns 1988-1995 -10/+1 USA
With Activity Diversification 18,02*** -2,70*** -2,17** 14,53*** -1,80*** -0,69ns 1988-1995 -10/+1 USA
With Activity Focusing 18,66*** 0,14ns 3,00*** 16,61*** -1,68*** 0,04ns 1988-1995 -10/+1 USA
DeLong (2003a) With Activity Diversification 10,58*** -4,04*** -1,3ns 10,48*** -1,16ns -0,72ns 1991-1995 -10/+1 USA
With Activity Focusing 16,78*** 0,65ns 4,35*** 20,79*** -5,18*** -1,23ns 1991-1995 -10/+1 USA
Cornett et al. (2003) - -0,38na - - -0,97na - 1988-1995 -1/0 USA
- -0,40na - - -1,06na - 1988-1995 -1/+1 USA
Becher and Campbell (2005) 16,69na -1,59na 0,87na 13,98na -1,29na 0,79na 1990-1999 -5/+1 USA
The information in this table refers to sub-samples or studies that focus on interstate and intrastate mergers and thus differs from the results presented in Graphs 1-3 and Table 9.
(*,**,***) denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. (ns) denotes insignificance and (na) denotes that observation for significance is missing. 







Table 4. Domestic vs. Cross-Border Mergers 
Table 4
Paper Comment Target Bidder Combined Target Bidder Combined Sample Period Event Window Country Coverage
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - - -0,12na - - -0,41na 1989-1996 -1/0 Europe
- - -0,29na - - -0,37na 1989-1996 -1/+1 Europe
- - -0,01na - - -0,19na 1989-1996 -5/+5 Europe
- - 0,48na - - -0,16na 1989-1996 -40/+40 Europe
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) with cancelled deals 13,74na -0,49na 4,00na 18,29na 1,38na 2,28na 1988-1997 -10/0 Europe
completed deals 14,28na 0,19na 4,47na 22,22na 2,00na 2,92na 1988-1997 -10/0 Europe
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 0,57** - - -0,62* - 1985-2000 -1/0 Mixed
- 0,62* - - -0,85** - 1985-2000 -1/+1 Mixed
- 0,77* - - -0,61na - 1985-2000 -2/+2 Mixed
- 1,46* - - -0,87na - 1985-2000 -5/+5 Mixed
- 1,34* - - -1,23na - 1985-2000 -10/+10 Mixed
- - - - -0,99* - 1985-2000 -1/0 Europe
- - - - -1,56** - 1985-2000 -1/+1 Europe
- - - - -1,41* - 1985-2000 -2/+2 Europe
- - - - -1,68na - 1985-2000 -5/+5 Europe
- - - - -2,29na - 1985-2000 -10/+10 Europe
Bessler and Murtagh (2002) retail bank targets 11,7*** 2,20ns - - -0,5ns - 1998-2001 -1/+1 Canada
retail bank targets 12,0*** 9,6*** - - -1,1*** - 1998-2001 -5/+5 Canada
Amihud, Delong and Saunders (2002) - -0,16ns - - -1,29* - 1985-1998 -10/+1 Europe
Ismail and Davidson (2005) - 0,52na - - 0,29na - 1987-1999 -1/+1 Europe
- 0,35na - - 0,25na - 1987-1999 -1/0 Europe
- 0,46na - - 0,37na - 1987-1999 -5/0 Europe
- 0,44na - - 0,22na - 1987-1999 0/+1 Europe
- -0,04na - - 0,81na - 1987-1999 0/+5 Europe
- 0,17na - - 0,86na - 1987-1999 0/+10 Europe
- -0,05na - - 1,26na - 1987-1999 0/+20 Europe
Soussa and Wheeler (2006) Emerging Europe - - - - -0,7ns - 1990-2003 -1/+7 Europe
Latin America - - - - -0,09* - 1990-2004 -1/+7 Europe
Emerging Asia - - - - -1,5*** - 1990-2005 -1/+7 Europe
Middle East & Africa - - - - -0,1ns - 1990-2006 -1/+7 Europe
Campa and Hernando (2008) 3,89* 1,00na 2,42na 3,33* 1,95na 3,04** 1998-2006 -90/-1 Europe
3,22** -0,54na 0,01na 3,82** -0,55na 0,05na 1998-2006 -1/+1 Europe
1,64na -1,96* -1,29na 1,95na -0,13na -0,29na 1998-2006 -1/+30 Europe
3,9na -1,78na -1,82na -5,33na -2,06na -2,83na 1998-2006 -1/+360 Europe
The information in this table refers to sub-samples or studies that focus on domestic and and cross-border mergers and thus differs from the results presented in Graphs 1-3 and Table 9.
(*,**,***) denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. (ns) denotes insignificance and (na) denotes that observation for significance is missing. 
Geo-Focusing Geo-Diversifying Sample Info
 
Table 5. CARs – Method of Payment 
Table 5
Paper Cash Stock Mixed Cash Stock Mixed Cash Stock Mixed Sample Period Event Window Country Coverage
Sushka and Bendeck (1988) -0,80na -1,94* - - - - - - - 1972-1985 -4/0 USA
Cornett and De (1991a) - - - - - - 0,34na 0,71na 0,89na 1982-1986 n/a USA
 Cornett and De (1991b) 1,05na 0,97na 0,48na 12,55na 9,46na 6,28na - - - 1982-1990 -1/+1 USA
Grullon, Michaely and Swary (1997) -0,87na -2,46na -1,93na 10,95na 9,74na 9,82na 5,01na 3,59na 3,83na 1981-1990 -1/1 USA
Becher (2000)  - -1,04na 0,65na - 20,84na 25,38na - - - 1980-1997 -30/+5 USA
 - -0,86na -0,03na - 17,33na 23,74na - - - 1980-1985 -30/+5 USA
 - -3,94na 0,65na - 16,41na 25,76na - - - 1986-1990 -30/+5 USA
 - -0,12na 1,12na - 22,86na 26,28na - - - 1991-1997 -30/+5 USA
 - -1,55na -0,32na - 15,88na 19,07na - - - 1980-1997 -5/+5 USA
 - -1,76na -0,47na - 13,34na 17,57na - - - 1980-1985 -5/+5 USA
 - -2,74na -0,26na - 14,49na 23,14na - - - 1986-1990 -5/+5 USA
 - -1,12na -0,25na - 16,76na 17,41na - - - 1991-1997 -5/+5 USA
Cornett et al. (2003) 0,55** -0,75**  - - - - - - - 1988-1995 -1/0 USA
0,50** -0,85**  - - - - - - - 1988-1995 -1/+1 USA
Ismail and Davidson (2005) - - - - - - 0,62na 0,47na 1,59na 1989-1999 -1/+1 Europe
- - - - - - 0,81na 0,18na 0,73na 1989-1999 -1/+10 Europe
- - - - - - 1,51na -0,02na 0,24na 1989-1999 -20/+20 Europe
- - - - - - 1,52na 0,42na -0,24na 1989-1999 -20/+20 Europe
- - - - - - 0,30na 0,44na 1,21na 1989-1999 -5/0 Europe
- - - - - - 0,69na 0,40na 1,83na 1989-1999 0/+2 Europe
The information in this table refers to sub-samples or studies that method of payment and thus differs from the results presented in Graphs 1-3 and Table 9.
(*,**,***) denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. (ns) denotes insignificance and (na) denotes that observation for significance is missing. 







Table 6. CARs – Strategy Focus 
Table 6
Paper Comment Target Bidder Combined Target Bidder Combined Sample Period Event Window Country Coverage
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) with cancelled deals 14,72na -0,47na 2,54na 15,02na 1,02na 5,49na 1988-1997 -10/0 Europe
completed deals 15,26na 0,26na 2,81na 18,11na 1,54na 6,33na 1988-1997 -10/0 Europe
DeLong (2001) 18,3*** -1,46*** 0,62ns 15,32*** -1,85*** -0,40ns 1988-1995 -10/+1 USA
With Geo-Diversification 16,61*** -1,68*** 0,04ns 14,53*** -1,80*** -0,69ns 1988-1995 -10/+1 USA
With Geo-Focusing 18,66*** 0,14ns 3,00*** 18,02*** -2,70*** -2,17** 1988-1995 -10/+1 USA
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) Bank2Bank vs. Bank2Non-Bank 7,76*** - . 19,34*** - - 1985-2000 -1/0 Europe
9,46*** - . 21,94*** - - 1985-2000 -1/+1 Europe
9,90*** - . 25,39*** - - 1985-2000 -2/+2 Europe
10,20*** - . 23,64*** - - 1985-2000 -5/+5 Europe
10,98*** - . 25,54*** - - 1985-2000 -10/+10 Europe
Bank2Non-Bank - - - - - 1,71*** 1985-2000 -1/0 Europe
- - - - - 2,58*** 1985-2000 -1/+1 Europe
- - - - - 2,35*** 1985-2000 -2/+2 Europe
- - - - - 1,85** 1985-2000 -5/+5 Europe
- - - - - 2,44** 1985-2000 -10/+10 Europe
DeLong (2003a) With Geo-Diversification 10,58*** -4,04*** -1,30na 10,48*** -1,16na -0,72na 1991-1995 -10/+1 USA
With Geo-Focusing 16,78*** 0,65na 4,35*** 20,79*** -5,18*** -1,23na 1991-1995 -10/+1 USA
Cornett et al. (2003) - -0,19ns - - -1,21*** - 1988-1995 -1/0 USA
- -0,17ns - - -1,31*** - 1988-1995 -1/+1 USA
Ismail and Davidson (2005) Bank2Bank vs. Cross-Product - 0,66na - - 0,28na - 1989-1999 -1,+1 Europe
- 0,41na - - 0,22na - 1989-1999 -1/0 Europe
- 0,43na - - 0,20na - 1989-1999 -2/0 Europe
- 0,53na - - -0,30na - 1989-1999 0/+5 Europe
- 0,53na - - 0,39na - 1989-1999 0/+10 Europe
Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2006) - - 3,62*** - - 0,68ns 1990-2000 -1/0 USA
The information in this table refers to sub-samples or studies that focus on activity focusing and diversification and thus differs from the results presented in Graphs 1-3 and Table 9.
(*,**,***) denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. (ns) denotes insignificance and (na) denotes that observation for significance is missing. 




Table 7. CARs – Size 
Table 7
Paper Comment Target Bidder Combined Target Bidder Combined Sample Period Event Window Country Coverage
Rad and Van Beek (1999) Small vs. Large Bidding Banks - - -0,91na - - -0,78na 1989-1996 -40/-1 Europe
- - -0,47na - - -0,96na 1989-1996 -10/-1 Europe
- - -1,12na - - -0,04na 1989-1996 -5/-1 Europe
- - -0,06na - - -0,57na 1989-1996 -1/0 Europe
- - 0,16na - - -0,38na 1989-1996 0/0 Europe
- - 0,36na - - -0,58na 1989-1996 0/+1 Europe
- - 0,55na - - 0,26na 1989-1996 +1/+5 Europe
- - 1,22na - - 0,82na 1989-1996 +1/+10 Europe
- - 1,22na - - 0,99na 1989-1996 +1/+40 Europe
- - 0,14na - - -0,77na 1989-1996 -1/+1 Europe
- - -0,41na - - -0,16na 1989-1996 -5/+5 Europe
- - 0,92na - - -0,52na 1989-1996 -10/+10 Europe
- - 0,48na - - -0,17na 1989-1996 -40/+40 Europe
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) Small vs. Large Deals 16,18ns 0,87* 3,40ns 11,49ns -1,53* 3,75* 1988-1997 -10/0 Europe
Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005) large2large vs. Small2small 2,25na 2,70na - 12,14*** -0,18na - 1983-2000 -3/0 Norway
0,64na 1,85na - 7,48** -0,85na - 1983-2000 0/0 Norway
Large 2 Small 19.84*** - - - -0,39na - 1983-2000 -3/0 Norway
8,81*** - - - -0,55na - 1983-2000 0/0 Norway
Becher and Campbell (2005) Small vs. Large Deals 16,46*** -1,10*** 1,03** 17,63*** -2,00*** 0,56na 1990-1999 -5/+1 USA
Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2006) Large vs. Small Banks - - 2,21** - - 4,69*** 1990-2000 -1/0 USA
Campa and Hernando (2008) Small vs. Large Deals 0,05na 2,26na 3,27na 5,30** 2,23na 3,12** 1998-2006 -90/-1 EU
4,55** -1,46na -0,37na 1,52na -0,97** -0,50na 1998-2006 -1/+1 EU
1,51na -2,38na -1,08na 0,94na -0,77na -0,59na 1998-2006 -1/+30 EU
-1,1na -11,34na -7,05na 1,97na 5,96na 4,64na 1998-2006 -1/+360 EU
The information in this table refers to sub-samples or studies that focus on deal or bank size and thus differs from the results presented in Graphs 1-3 and Table 9.
(*,**,***) denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. (ns) denotes insignificance and (na) denotes that observation for significance is missing. 





Table 8. CARs – Corporate Governance 
Table 8
Paper Comment Target Bidder Combined Sample Period Event Window Country Coverage
Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990) Hostile 17,29*** -1,28*** - 1980-1987 -1/0 USA
18,81*** -2,07*** - 1980-1987 -2/+2 USA
20,92*** -1,08ns - 1980-1987 -5/+5 USA
27,41*** -1,47ns - 1980-1987 -60/+60 USA
Non-Hostile 10,92*** -1,27*** - 1980-1987 -1/0 USA
12,21*** -2,12*** - 1980-1987 -2/+2 USA
12,98*** -3,19*** - 1980-1987 -5/+5 USA
14,35*** -4,20ns - 1980-1987 -60/+60 USA
Baradwaj, Dubofsky and Fraser (1991) Defensive Bidders - -3,537*** - 1981-1987 -1/0 USA
- -3,762*** - 1981-1987 -2/+2 USA
- -4,966*** - 1981-1987 -5/+5 USA
Non-Defensive Bidders - -1,020*** - 1981-1987 -1/0 USA
- -1,599*** - 1981-1987 -2/+2 USA
- -2,240*** - 1981-1987 -5/+5 USA
Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) Low Equity Compensation - -0,25** - 1993-1998 -1/0 USA
High Equity Compensation - 0,30** - 1993-1998 -1/0 USA
Gupta and Misra (2007) Value Enhancing Mergers 20,21*** -0,08ns 3,35*** 1981-2004 -1/+1 USA
Value Reducing Mergers 11,99*** -3,62*** -2,8*** 1981-2004 -1/+1 USA
Value Enhancing and Reducing 16,12*** -1,84*** 0,29** 1981-2004 -1/+1 USA
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2007) High Investor Protection - -2,22na - 1996-2004 -2/+2 Europe & USA
Medium Investor Protection - -0,32na - 1996-2004 -2/+2 Europe & USA
Low Investor Protection - 1,31na - 1996-2004 -2/+2 Europe & USA
The information in this table refers to sub-samples or studies that focus on corporate governace and thus differs from the results presented in Graphs 1-3 and Table 9.
(*,**,***) denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. (ns) denotes insignificance and (na) denotes that observation for significance is missing. 





Table 9. CARs – Main Table of Cross-Country Differences 
Table 1   Target Bidder Combined Sample Info 









Whalen (1997) - - - - 39 -3,93na - - - - n/a -90/-11 USA 
Campa and Hernando (2008) - 218 3,74** 60 218 -0,54* 57 196 2,60** 59 1998-2006 -90/-1 EU 
Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990) Non-Hostile 30 14,35*** - 30 -4,20ns - - - - 1980-1987 -60/+60 USA 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 5,93na - 56 -0,73na - - - - 1989-1996 -40/-1 Europe 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 5,71na - 56 0,18ns - - - - 1989-1996 -40/+40 Europe 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 7,40** - 28 -2,08ns - 28 2,54ns - 1994-2003 -30/0 Europe 
Becher (2000) - 558 22,64na - 558 -0,10na - 558 3,03na - 1980-1997 -30/+5 USA 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 2,54ns - 28 -3,06ns - 28 8,44ns - 1994-2003 -30/+30 Italy 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 3,28** - 28 -1,86ns - 28 8,69*** - 1994-2003 -15/+15 Italy 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 14,16*** 73 98 0,42ns 54 98 1,46*** 65 1985-2000 -20/0 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w = TA, Gen. Ind. 72 17,95na 74 54 1,46ns 63 54 3,58na 76 1988-1997 -20/0 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w= EV, Bank Ind. 72 16,63na 75 54 0,31ns 59 54 4,49na 78 1988-1997 -20/0 Europe 
Pilloff (1996) - - - - - - - 48 1,32na - 1982-1991 -20/0 USA 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 204 -0,12ns 32 - - - 1996-2004 -20/+5 Mix 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 53 -0,03ns - - - - 1996-2004 -20/+5 Europe 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 151 -0,14ns - - - - 1996-2004 -20/+5 USA 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w = TA, Gen. Ind. 72 15,30na 69 54 2,19na 63 54 3,69na 65 1988-1997 -20/+20 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w= EV, Bank Ind. 72 14,01na 64 54 1,03ns 56 54 4,27na 65 1988-1997 -20/+20 Europe 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 16,00*** 77 98 -0,20ns 52 98 2,01*** 64 1985-2000 -20/+20 Europe 
Ismail and Davidson (2005) - 89 4,41na 69 89 0,08na 55 76 0,36na 58 1987-1999 -20/+20 Europe 
Schiereck and Straus (2000) (A) - 1 30,1na - - - - - - - 1998-1999 -20/+20 USA/Ger 
Seidel (1995) (A) - - - - 123 1,8na - - - - 1989-1991 -20/+20 USA 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 6,40*** - 28 -1,65ns - 28 2,27** - 1994-2003 -15/0 Italy 
Pilloff (1996) - - - - - - - 48 0,73na - 1982-1991 -15/0 USA 
Hannan and Wolken (1989) w= stock value 69 15,81na 86 43 -5,06na 33 43 0,46na 49 1982-1987 -15/0 USA 
James and Wier (1987) - - - - 60 0,65na 63 - - - 1971-1983 -15/0 USA 
Cornett and De (1991a) - 37 9,66na 48 152 -0,40ns 41 - - - 1982-1986 -15/+15 USA 
Hannan and Wolken (1989) w= stock value 69 14,25na 75 43 -6,09na 28 43 -0,99na 42 1982-1987 -15/+15 USA 
James and Wier (1987) - - - - 60 0,81na 68 - - - 1971-1983 -15/+15 USA 
Aggarwal, Akhigbe, McNulty (2006) - 271 3,08*** 58 271 -0,23na 47 271 -0,06na 49 1986-2001 -11/-2 USA 
Whalen (1997) - - - - 39 -0,03na - - - - n/a -10/-3 USA 
Djankov, Jindra and Klapper (2005) - - - - - - - 9 8,65*** - 1998-1999 -10/-2 Asia 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 2,84na - 56 -0,37na - - - - 1989-1996 -10/-1 Europe 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 12,31*** 74 98 0,14ns 58 98 1,46*** 65 1985-2000 -10/0 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) Includes cancelled  72 14,82na 75 54 0,03ns 48 54 3,52na 67 1987-1998 -10/0 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) Excluces cancelled 61 16,1na 75 46 0,70ns 57 46 4,03na 67 1987-1998 -10/0 Europe 
Pilloff (1996) - - - - - - - 48 1,44* - 1982-1991 -10/0 USA 
Amihud, DeLong and Saunders (2002) - - - - 28 -2,38*** 29 - - - 1985-1998 -10/+1 UK 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 54 0,03ns - - - - 1996-2004 -10/+1 Europe 
Delong (2003b) - 41 8,60*** - 41 0,17na - 41 1,32* - 1988-1999 -10/+1 Non-USA 
Delong (2003b) - 438 14,76*** - 438 1,89*** - 438 0,12na - 1988-1999 -10/+1 Mix 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 204 -0,18* 34 - - - 1996-2004 -10/+1 Mix 
Amihud, DeLong and Saunders (2002) - - - - 214 -0,98*** 37 - - - 1985-1998 -10/+1 Mix 
DeLong (2001) - 280 16,61*** 87 280 -1,68*** 34 280 0,04ns 49 1988-1995 -10/+1 USA 
DeLong (2003a) - 54 14,70*** - 54 -2,51*** - 54 0,85na - 1991-1995 -10/+1 USA 
Delong (2003b) - 397 15,39*** - 397 -2,10*** - 397 0,00na - 1988-1999 -10/+1 USA 
Delong and Deyoung (2007) - 216 16,43*** - 216 -2,39*** - 216 0,30na - 1987-1999 -10/+1 USA 
Amihud, DeLong and Saunders (2002) - - - - 19 -0,53ns 53 - - - 1985-1998 -10/+1 USA 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2007) - - - - 151 -0,25*** - - - - 1996-2004 -10/+1 USA 
Delong and Deyoung (2007) - 216 15,05*** - 216 -3,16*** - 216 -0,39na - 1987-1999 -10/+5 USA 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 14,39*** 78 98 0,24ns 53 98 1,35** 65 1985-2000 -10/+10 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w = TA, Gen. Ind. 72 14,16na 69 54 1,16ns 44 54 3,07na 59 1988-1997 -10/+10 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w= EV, Bank Ind. 72 12,95na 67 54 0,11ns 43 54 3,41na 59 1988-1997 -10/+10 Europe 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 4,6na - 56 0,43na - - - - 1989-1996 -10/+10 Europe 
Soussa and Wheeler (2006) - - - - 66 -0,01na - - - - 1990-2003 -10/+10 Mix 
DeLong and DeYoung (2007) - 216 14,96*** - 216 -3,09*** - 216 -0,26na - 1987-1999 -10/+10 USA 
Pilloff (1996) - - - - - - - 48 1,05na - 1982-1991 -7/0 USA 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 1,97na - 56 -0,54na - - - - 1989-1996 -5/-1 Europe 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 3,28*** - 28 -0,54ns - 28 1,58*** - 1994-2003 -5/0 Italy 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 11,23*** 69 98 0,38ns 54 98 1,43*** 64 1985-2000 -5/0 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w = TA, Gen. Ind. 72 15,02na 72 54 0,58ns 44 54 2,37na 67 1988-1997 -5/0 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w= EV, Bank Ind. 72 14,21na 76 54 -0,40ns 52 54 2,88na 67 1988-1997 -5/0 Europe 
Ismail and Davidson (2005) - - - - - - - 76 0,45na 58 1987-1999 -5/0 Europe 
Black et al. (2005) - - 15,11*** - - -0,09ns - - - - 1986-1998 -5/0 USA 
Pilloff (1996) - - - - - - - - 0,6na - 1982-1991 -5/0 USA 
Anderson, Becher and Campbell (2004)   97 15,45na - 97 -1,12na - 97 1,7na - 1990-1997 -5/+1 USA 
Allen and Cebenoyan (1991) (A) - - - - 138 ns. - - - - 1979-1986 -5/+1 USA 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 -0,37ns - 28 -2,90* - 28 2,29ns - 1994-2003 -5/+5 Italy 
Bessler and Murtagh (2002) targets are national - 12,00*** - - -1,80*** - - - - 1998-2001 -5/+5 Canada 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 13,35*** 72 98 0,46ns 47 98 1,45*** 63 1985-2000 -5/+5 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w = TA, Gen. Ind. 72 13,52na 71 54 1,08ns 46 54 2,53na 61 1988-1997 -5/+5 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w= EV, Bank Ind. 72 12,55na 72 54 -0,17ns 50 54 2,86na 59 1988-1997 -5/+5 Europe 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 4,59na - 56 -0,09na - - - - 1989-1996 -5/+5 Europe 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) (B) - - - - 106 nr - - - - 1989-1992 -5/+5 USA 
Zhang (1995) (A) - 107 6,9na - 107 ns - 107 7,3na - 1980-1990 -5/+5 USA 
Palia (1994) (A)  - - - - 48 -1,5na - - - - 1984-1987 -5/+5 USA 
Baradwaj et al. (1992) (A) - - - - 108 -2,6na - - - - 1981-1987 -5/+5 USA 
Baradwaj, Dubofsky and Fraser (1991) - - - - - - - 76 0,26na 62 1981-1987 -5/+5 USA 
Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990) Non-Hostile 30 12,98*** - 30 -3,19*** - - - - 1980-1987 -5/+5 USA 
Becher (2000) - - 17,10na - - -1,08na - - 1,8na - 1980-1997 -5/+5 USA 
Zollo and Leshchinkskii (2000) - - - - 307 -0,27na - - - - 1964-1995 -5/+5 USA 
Allen and Cebenoyan (1991) (A) - - - - 138 ns - - - - 1979-1986 -5/+5 USA 
DeLong and DeYoung (2007) - 216 13,92*** - 216 -3,15*** - 216 -0,47na - 1987-1999 -5/+5 USA 
Hannan and Wolken (1989) - 69 14,19na 83 43 -3,55na 21 - - - 1982-1987 -4/0 USA 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) - 153 14,39*** - 153 -2,32*** - 153 0,38ns - 1985-1991 -4/0 USA 
Sushka and Bendeck (1988) Non-Emergency - - - 39 -0,74ns - - - - 1972-1985 -4/0 USA 
James and Wier (1987) - - - - 60 1,77na 68 - - - 1971-1983 -4/0 USA 
Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) - 64 20,80na - 64 -3,47na - 64 1,86na - 1985-1996 -4/0 USA 
Houston and Ryngaert (1997) (A) - 209 20,4na - 209 -2,4na - - - - 1985-1992 -4L/+1A USA 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 0,87*** - 28 -0,79ns - 28 2,60*** - 1994-2003 -3/0 Italy 
Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005) Completed M&AS 8 24,89** - 14 -1,24ns - - - - 1983-2000 -3/0 Norway 
Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005) Announced M&As 27 14,38*** - 33 0,34ns - - - - 1983-2000 -3/0 Norway 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 -1,02* - 28 -3,71*** - 28 1,81ns - 1994-2003 -3/+3 Italy 
Whalen (1997) - - - - 39 0,89na - - - - n/a -2/-1 USA 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 11,38*** 76 98 0,07ns 53 98 1,38*** 70 1985-2000 -2/0 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w = TA, Gen. Ind. 72 14,31na 81 54 0,70ns 52 54 2,27na 70 1988-1997 -2/0 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w= EV, Bank Ind. 72 13,68na 82 54 -0,20ns 52 54 2,81na 74 1988-1997 -2/0 Europe 
Whalen (1997) - - - - 39 1,22na - - - - n/a -2/0 USA 
Pilloff (1996) - - - - - -   48 0,15na - 1982-1991 -2/0 USA 
Ismail and Davidson (2005) - 89 2,11na 66 89 0,18na 49 76 0,49na 64 1987-1999 -2/+2 Europe 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 13,54*** 77 98 0,18ns 43 98 1,70*** 63 1985-2000 -2/+2 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w = TA, Gen. Ind. 72 13,68na 76 54 1,40na 52 54 2,58na 67 1988-1997 -2/+2 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w= EV, Bank Ind. 72 12,77na 75 54 0,16ns 48 54 2,89na 72 1988-1997 -2/+2 Europe 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 53 0,08*** - - - - 1996-2004 -2/+2 Europe 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 204 -0,32*** 32 - - - 1996-2004 -2/+2 Mix 
Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990) Non-Hostile 30 12,21*** - 30 -2,12*** - - - - 1980-1987 -2/+2 USA 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 151 -0,47** -   - - 1996-2004 -2/+2 USA 
Djankov, Jindra and Klapper (2005) - - - - - - - 9 -1,27ns - 1998-1999 -1/0 Asia 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w = TA, Gen. Ind. 72 13,16na 81 54 0,62ns 59 54 2,06na 69 1988-1997 -1/0 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w= EV, Bank Ind. 72 12,55na 82 54 -0,17ns 52 54 2,65na 74 1988-1997 -1/0 Europe 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 10,48*** 71 98 0,06ns 54 98 1,20*** 66 1985-2000 -1/0 Europe 
Aggarwal, Akhigbe, McNulty (2006) - 204 8,96*** 75 204 
-
11,05*** 34 204 2,31** 51 1986-2001 -1/0 USA 
Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990) Non-Hostile 30 10,92*** - 30 -1,27*** - - - - 1980-1987 -1/0 USA 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992) - 30 8,00*** - 30 -0,80** - - - - 1982-1987 -1/0 USA 
Cornett et al. (2003) - - - - 423 -0,70** 40 - - - 1988-1995 -1/0 USA 
Black et al. (2005) - - 13,14*** - - -0,04ns - - - - 1986-1998 -1/0 USA 
Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2006) - - 16,87*** - - -0,65** - - 3,59*** - 1990-2000 -1/0 USA 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) - - - - 1719 0,02ns - - - - 1993-1998 -1/0 USA 
Hannan and Wolken (1989) - 69 11,12na 77 43 -3,78na 19 - - - 1982-1987 -1/0 USA 
James and Wier (1987) - - - - 60 1,07na 66 - - - 1972-1983 -1/0 USA 
Pilloff (1996) - - - - - - - 48 -0,04na - 1982-1991 -1/0 USA 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 4,46** - 56 -0,25na - - - - 1989-1996 -1/0 USA 
Siems (1996) Megamergers 19 12,81*** - 19 -1,49*** - - - - 1995-1995 -1/0 USA 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999) (A) - - - - - - - 3844 0,8na - 1989-1996 -1/0 USA 
Cyree and DeGannaro (1999) (A)  - - - - 132 ns - - - - 1989-1995 -1/0 USA 
Toyne and Tripo (1998) (A) - 68 10,9na - 68 -2,2na - 68 -0,7na - 1991-1995 -1/0 USA 
Banerjee and Cooperman (1998) (A) - 92 13,1na - 92 -1,3na - - - - 1990-1995 -1/0 USA 
Whalen (1997) - - - - 39 0,94na - - - - n/a -1/0 USA 
Bessler and Murtagh (2002) targets are national - 11,70*** - - 0,4ns - - - - 1998-2001 -1/+1 Canada 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 12,39*** 72 98 -0,01ns 49 98 1,40*** 60 1985-2000 -1/+1 Europe 
Campa and Hernando (2006) (B) - - - - 244 -0,87na - - - - 1998-2002 -1/+1 Europe 
Campa and Hernando (2008) - 218 3,38** 58 218 -0,54* 49 196 0,02na 53 1998-2006 -1/+1 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w = TA, Gen. Ind. 72 12,93na 76 54 0,99na 56 54 2,22na 70 1988-1997 -1/+1 Europe 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) w= EV, Bank Ind. 72 12,09na 75 54 -0,19ns 50 54 2,67na 70 1988-1997 -1/+1 Europe 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 53 0,09*** - - - - 1996-2004 -1/+1 Europe 
Ismail and Davidson (2005) - 89 2,35na 67 89 0,03na 46 76 0,49na 62 1987-1999 -1/+1 Europe 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 4,65** - 56 -0,33na - - - - 1989-1996 -1/+1 Europe 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) - - 14,75*** - - 1,04** - - - - 1997-2003 -1/+1 Europe 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 204 -0,50*** 31 - - - 1996-2004 -1/+1 Mix 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) - - 19,06*** - - -0,99*** - - - - 1997-2003 -1/+1 Mix 
Cornett et al. (2003) - - - - 423 -0,74** 40 - - - 1988-1995 -1/+1 USA 
Gupta and Misra (2007) - 503 16,12*** - 503 -1,84*** - 503 0,29** - 1981-2004 -1/+1 USA 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 151 -0,70*** - - - - 1996-2004 -1/+1 USA 
Siems (1996) - 19 13,04*** - 19 -1,96*** - - - - 1995-1995 -1/+1 USA 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) - - 20,15*** - - -1,50*** - - - - 1997-2003 -1/+1 USA 
Hudgins and Seifert (1996) (A) - 160 7,80na - 160 ns - - - - 1970-1989 -1/+1 USA 
Bliss and Rosen (2001) (B)   - - - 66 -2,40na - - - - 1986-1995 -1/+1 USA 
Subrahmanyan et al. (1997) (A) - - - - 225 -0,90na - - - - 1982-1987 -1/+1 USA 
Grullon, Michaely and Swary (1997) - 146 9,97*** - 146 -2,04*** - 146 3,88*** - 1981-1990 -1/+1 USA 
Campa and Hernando (2008) - 218 1,73* 52 218 -1,46* 45 196 -1,00na 46 1998-2006 -1/+30 Europe 
Campa and Hernando (2008) - 218 1,32na 51 218 0,31na 51 196 -2,11na 51 1998-2006 -1/+360 Europe 
Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005) Completed M&AS 8 10,84* - 14 -0,59ns - - - - 1983-2000 0/0 Norway 
Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005) Announced M&As 27 7,11*** - 33 -0,11ns - - - - 1983-2000 0/0 Norway 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 53 0,36*** - - - - 1996-2004 0/0 Europe 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) - - 12,08*** - - -0,76** - - - - 1997-2003 0/0 Europe 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) - 98 8,27*** 65 98 -0,14ns 47 98 0,91*** 56 1985-2000 0/0 Europe 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 3,77** - 56 -0,12na - - - - 1989-1996 0/0 Europe 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) - - 13,51*** - - -0,48*** - - - - 1997-2003 0/0 Mix 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 204 -0,93*** 36 - - - 1996-2004 0/0 Mix 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) - - 13,87*** - - -0,79*** - - - - 1997-2003 0/0 USA 
Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2008) - - - - 151 -1,40** - - - - 1996-2004 0/0 USA 
Hannan and Wolken (1989) - 69 3,62na 57 43 -1,45na 37 - - - 1982-1987 0/0 USA 
Kane (2000) (A) - 110 11,4na - 110 -1,5na - - - - 1991-1998 0/0 USA 
James and Wier (1987) - - - - 60 0,39na 56 - - - 1971-1983 0/0 USA 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 3,96** - 56 -0,19na - - - - 1989-1996 0/+1 Europe 
Brewer et al. (2000) (A) - 327 
[8,3-
14,0) - - - - - - - 1990-1998 0/+1 USA 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 -1,89*** - 28 -2,58*** - 28 -1,16ns - 1994-2003 0/+3 Italy 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 -1,95*** - 28 -2,12*** - 28 -1,78ns - 1994-2003 0/+5 Italy 
Hawawini and Swary (1990) (A) - 123 11,50na - 123 1,70na - 123 3,10na - 1972-1987 0/+5 USA 
Black et al. (2005) - - 10,16*** - - -0,26ns - - - - 1986-1998 0/+5 USA 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 1,01ns - 28 0,06ns - 28 2,01ns - 1994-2003 0/+15 Italy 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) - 28 0,01ns - 28 -0,52ns - - 0,56ns - 1994-2003 0/+30 Italy 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) - - 11,76*** - - -4,47*** - - - - 1997-2003 0/+20 Europe 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) - - 18,92*** - - -1,37ns - - - - 1997-2003 0/+20 Mix 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) - - 20,71*** - - -0,59ns - - - - 1997-2003 0/+20 USA 
Madura and Wiant (1994) (A) -   - - 152 -27,1na - - - - 1983-1987 0/36m USA 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 -1,14na - 56 0,57na - - - - 1989-1996 +1/+5 Europe 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 -2,01na - 56 0,92na - - - - 1989-1996 +1/+10 Europe 
Whalen (1997) - - - - 39 -1,87na - - - - n/a +1/+30 USA 
Rad and Van Beek (1999) - 17 -3,99na - 56 1,03na - - - - 1989-1996 +1/+40 Europe 
Djankov, Jindra and Klapper (2005) domestic  - - - - - - 9 -4,32ns - 1998-1999 +1/+50 Asia 
Whalen (1997) - - - - 39 -0,93na - - - - n/a +1/+90 USA 
Aggarwal, Akhigbe, McNulty (2006) - 271 -0,85ns 38 271 -0,07ns 43 271 -0,49ns 42 1986-2001 +2/+11 USA 
(A) denotes that the result was obtained from Beitel and Schiereck (2001) and (B) from Hagendorff, Collins, Keasey (2007). W=TA, and W=EV denote total assets and equity value used  
as weights for the merged entity, Gen. Ind. And Bank Ind. Denote that the bidder and target return benchmarks were based on general market index and bank industry index. 
(*,**,***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level when provided. (ns) denotes insignificance, (nr) irrelevance and (na) that observation for significance is missing.     
The results in this table are chosen from the main samples or subsamples that best represent the findings. 
       
 
  
 
